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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CONSTITUTIONALISM, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA
James C. N. Pati*
My contribution is in the nature of an annotation to Professor Seid-
man's stimulating article.' His topic and thesis deserve more attention
than either of us bestows. I shall outline why I think the subject is im-
portant, and, following Seidman, shall examine, first, constitutional expe-
rience with judicial review in Anglophonic countries and then explana-
tions for it, and finally, some prescriptions for the future. All this is done
in a very summary way and runs the usual risks of overgeneralization.
At best our combined articles suggest issues worthy of more analysis.
A further caveat is in order. Not only is the subject difficult and
politically charged, but American commentators may easily form skewed
perceptions about public law in Africa because of the difficulty of under-
standing its context. Further, because of their own ethnocentrism, they
may have perceptions about the value of and possibilities for judicial re-
view which are not widely understood or shared in other cultures.2 As
will be apparent, I believe that efforts to secure better definition and pro-
tection of human rights are an important task of legal development. I do
not think it has been proven, though it is often asserted, that because most
Africans are poor, badly educated, and hungry-and because their free-
dom has been circumscribed in the past-they do not care about the is-
sues at stake in the creation of the rule of law.3
I. THE SUBJECT
Seidman suggests that constitutionalism (Western-style) and judicial
review were elements of a misguided colonial "vision" for independent
Africa. These concepts were transferred, via independence constitutions,
*Professor of Law, Rutgers, The State University School of Law.
I Prof. R. B. Seidman's ar:ide is part of a comprehensive monograph on "Law and devel-
opment" in Africa which is the product of many years of teaching and study in various Afri-
can law schools. See the following by Seidman: The Reception of English Law in Colonial
Africa Revisited, 2 E. AFR. L REv. 47 (1969); Constitutions in Independent, Anglophonic,
Sub-Saharan Africa: Form and Legitimacy, 1969 Wis. L REv. 83; Law and Developrent: A
General Model, 6 L & SOC'Y REV. 311 (1972); Constitutional Standards of Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in Nigeria, 1 NIG. L J. 232 (1956).
2 For an earlier example of this phenomenon see Paul, Legal Education in Englisb-Speak-
ing Africa 15 J. LEGAL ED. 189 (1962). Cf. Justice Douglas' rather undiscriminating remarks
about constitutional development in developing coun:ries, Douglas, Lauyers of the Peace Corps
48 A.B.A.J. 909 (1962); Gunther, The Constitution of Ghana--An American's IMpressions
and Comparisons, 8 U. GHANA LJ. 2 (1971).
3 See generally the writings of African jurists and political leaders dted in notes 10 and 13
infra.
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primarily divised by Whitehall technicians, as parts of an effort to repro-
duce parliamentary democracy Westminister style and a Commonwealth
with shared, common political values and legal institutions. He exam-
ines Anglophonic African experience with judicial review under these
constitutions and concludes that it did not work, and is not workable.
His thesis may find a receptive audience. It has become fashionable
to dismiss the importance of constitutions in Africa. In essence the case is
that they are of marginal significance. 4 Perhaps, we are told, constitutions
provide aspirational guidelines and organizational plans for a govern-
ment of the day; but often they are facades which conceal the realities
of power centers and the actualities of much political behavior. In any
event, it is unrealistic to expect that they will be treated as laws having
some superior force capable of regulating the exercise of government.
We are sometimes reminded that constitutions are "borrowed" contriv-
ances to establish the legality of a new government rather than cultural
sources for legitimacy. A favorite, oft-used metaphor is to the effect that
they have been brakes put on government which really needed acceler-
ators.5 Constitutions did not reform land tenure systems, reduce poverty,
secure education and literacy for the ordinary man, or generate economic
growth. Thus constitutionalism and judicial review as developed in the
West are inappropriate models for developing African political systems.
It is important to examine this array of arguments for several reasons.
Since World War II, in diverse parts of the world-developed and less
so-political leaders have promulgated constitutions which proclaim the
existence of various human rights and endow the judiciary with power to
enforce them as law.'
The ideal that power should be controlled by law seems more perva-
sively held today than ever before despite ample causes for cynicism about
the gap between the ideal and day-to-day practices. By virtue of the
Charter of the United Nations, its Declaration of Human Rights, and
other U.N. institutions and various regional agreements, there has been
increasing international recognition of the importance of human rights-
4 For various discussions which reflect one or another of the arguments presented below, see
e.g., MARTIN, PERSONAL FREEDOM AND THE LAW OF TANZANIA (1974); L. Pytl, As.
PECTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1966); (especially chap. VI on law as a source of
"instability" and "rigidity"); Spiro, Constitutionalism and Constitutional Engineering (Paper
preented to African Studies Association Ninth Ann. Meeting, 1966); Lowenstein, Refleciont
on the Value of Constitutions in our Revolutary Age in COMPARATIVE POLITICS (H. Eckstein
& D. Apter eds. 1963); McAuslan, The Evolution of Public Law in Eait Africa in the 1960'.,
5 PUB. L 153 (1970); Palley, Rethinking the Judicial Role: The Judiciary and Good Gov-
crnment, 1 ZAMBIA LJ. 1 (1970); Seidman, Constitutions in Independent, Anglophonic Sub.
Saharan Africa: Form and Legitimacy, 1969 WISC. L. REV. 83.
5 See J. NYERERE, Democracy and The Party System in FREEDOM AND UNITY (1967).
I See M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971).
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and of the need for measures to secure them.i The emergence of an in-
ternational "common understanding of the peoples of the world concern-
ing the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human
family"' has been solemnly proclaimed. Perhaps one day supra-national
legal institutions with powers to provide remedies will exist; at least the
force of consensus cannot easily be ignored by governments which seek
respectability in the community of nations.'
Certainly, judicial review is no longer a purely western legal plie-
nomenon. In Africa, the question of whether governments are to be
accountable to legal standards, and if so by what means, has been iden-
tified by many outstanding jurists and political leaders as one of the most
important problems of political development. Many have eloquently ad-
vocated some form of judicial review, and others have favored alterna-
tive, but analogous, form of control to achieve the same result. It is cer-
tainly arguable that many peoples and groups in Africa have a peculiarly
vital interest in securing the protection of human rights.10
The study of experience with judicial review is also a fertile field for
students of comparative law and politics, if one attempts (as Seidman
does) not only to describe doctrinal evolution but also to explain that
TSee, e.g., L SOHN AND T. BUERGENTHAL, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTON OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973), setting forth, inter alia: the Universal Declraton
of Human Rights (1973); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1948);
the Proclamation of Teheran (1968); the Convention of the Political Rights of Women (1954);
the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965). For discussions,
see L SOHN AND T. BURGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECrION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. chip.
VI (1973).
8 Article 2 of the Proclamation of Teheran. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 34/21 U.N. Publ. E6g
XIV. 2 (1968).
9 See, e.g., C. JENKS, LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1967). It is interesting to note
that the bills of rights of Anglophonic African constitutions are patterned on the Europ.an Con-
vention of Human Rights. Chief Justice Boni of the Ivory Coast has championed adoption
of a pan-African convention on human rights. See Boni, International Legal Process in LEGAL
PROCESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL (African Source Materials compiled by Centre for African
Legal Development, Faculty of Law, Haile Se!lassie Univ., 1971) (reporting the various papers,
proceedings and reso!utions of the Conference of African Jurists convened by the United Na-
tions Economic Commission for Africa in 1971) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL PROCESS AND
THE INDIVIDUAL).
1) See generally, LEGAL PROCESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL; M'BAYE, Realities du Monde Noir
ct les Droits de L'Homme in LES DROITS DE LHOMME (1969); J. NYERERE, FREEDOM AND
DEVELOPMENT (1968); African Conference on the Rule of Law, A Report on the Proceedings
oi the Conferen:e (Lagos-Nigeria, January 3-7, 1971) in INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
JURISTS (Verhelst ed. 1961); Speech by Julius K. Nyerere given at the opening of the
Universi:y Campus in FREEDOM AND UNITY 310 (1966); Amachree, Fundamental Rights in
Nigeria, 11 How. L J. 463 (1965); Bentsi-Ensill, Problems in the Construction of Viable
Constitufional Structures in Africa in EXPANDING HORIZONS IN AFRICAN STUDIES (G. Carter
and A. Paden eds. 1969); Collier, Human Rights in Sicrra Leone, 11 HOW. L J. 500 (1965);
Elias, The Evolution of Law and Government in Modern Africa in AFRICAN LAW: ADAPTA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT (H. Kuper & L Kuper eds. 1968); Kaunda, The Functions of the
Lawyer in Zambia Today, 3 ZAMBIA L. J. 1 (1972).
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experience by putting it in social context." In view of the vastness of
the writing on development, it is surprising that so little attention of this
kind has been focused on this topic.12 Most of the legal literature about
judicial review is either aspirational or descriptive of doctrine or, as indi-
cated, a contrast between what was said in the law books and what has
happened." Political scientists, in their reaction against formal schools
of comparative government, and in their attempts to develop new ap.
proaches to political phenomena in developing countries have largely ne-
glected the study of constitutions. 14  Nor has much attention been given
to the character and behavior of courts as organs of government, or to
attitudes of politicians and bureaucrats toward constitutionalism.15 Per-
haps, before making authoritative judgments on the subject, we need
11 For some attempts at "comparison," see Gunther, supra note 2; Baldwin, A Constiltuton.
al Comparison: Mexico, United States and Uganda, 10 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 82 (1973), For
an interesting attempt to find meaningful bases for "comparison" of the operation of judicial
review to protect constitutional rights, see Sharma, "Law and Order" and Protection of the
Rights of the Accused in The United States and In India: A General Framework for Compari.
son, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 361 (1972).
12 On this point see Y. GHAI AND J. McAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND THE POLITICAL
CHANGE IN KENYA (1970). This monograph is a model of the kind of studies needed to
relate the development of public law to the political-economy context of particular countries.
13 A law-related bibliography on constitutional law for Anglophonic countries appears in
Karlsson, Sources for African Constitutional Studies, 6 AFRICAN LAW STUDIES 123 (1972).
See also, Bibliography in LEGAL PROCESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 9. For different
kinds of approaches to the subject and different assessments of experience and problems with
judicial review, see generally sources cited in note 4 and statements of various distinguished
African jurists set out in LEGAL PROCESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 9. See also F.
BENNION, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GHANA (1962); I. FRANCK, COMPARATIVE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTAl. RIGHTS IN COMMON LAW
COUNTRIES (1968); W. HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA (1966); W. JEN-
NINGS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEAL7H (1961); B. NWABtUZE, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW OF THE NIGERIAN REPUBLIC (1964); 1 J. PAUl. & C. CLAPHAM, ETHIOPIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, chap. I & IV (1967); 2 J. PAUL & C. CLAPHAM, ETHIO-
PIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, at 615-619 & chap. IX (1970); Aguda and Aguda,
Judicial Protection of Some Fundamental Rights in Nigeria and In The Sudan Before and Dur
ing Military Rule, 16 J. AFR. L. 130 (1972); De Smith, Fundamental Rights of The New Cont-
monwealth, 10 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 215 (1961); Ezejiofor, Judicial Interpretation of Con-
stitutions: Nigerian Experience, 2 NIG. L.J. 70 (1967); Ghai, Constitutions and the Political
Order in East Africa, 21 INT'L COMP. LQ. 403 (1972); Gyandoh, Principles of Judicial Inter-
pretation of The Republican Constitution of Ghana, 3 U. GHANA L.J, 37 (1966); Read,
Judicial Power and the Constitution of Ghana, 11 U. GIANA I.J. 10- (19-4); Seidman,
Constitutions in Africa, supra n.1; Williams, Fundamental Rights and the Prospect For
Democracy in Nigeria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1073 (1967).
14 For discussion of prevalent approaches to the study of political "change," "modeniza-
tion," and "development" in the 1960's see generally C. LEYS, POLITICS AND CHANGE IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1962); Huntington, The Change ts Change: Alodcrnizatinn. De
velopment and Politics, 1971 COMP. POL. 283; R. MACRIDIS, THE S'IUDY O1 COMPARATIVE
GOVERNMENT 7-12 (1955).
15 But cf. COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (G. Schubert and D. Danetski eds. 1969)
reporting studies of judicial attitudes, educational and pro!ftssional backgrouIkh. Sone of Illi
work provides interesting perspectives on the legal profession in Commonwealth countries, but
it seems unsatisfactory for reasons discussed by Seidman, i.e. th- narrowness of the approach.
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more systematic studies of experience, and explanations for it, within par-
ticular countries. Seidman's article offers the challenge of a number of
propositions which might be tested by such research.
II. EXPERIENCE
The independence constitutions of former British colonies were de-
signed to establish democratic methods for governance by creating par-
liaments chosen through competitive elections, parliamentary supremacy,
cabinet government, guaranteed political freedoms and other human
rights. These constitutions were also designed, in many instances, to
protect minority groups and to preserve regional interests and local tra-
ditions. Devices frequently used for these purposes included provisions
for federal or regional autonomy, bicameralism, constitutionally en-
trenched bills of rights, a politically neutral, independent civil service
and an independent judiciary with power to enforce the constitution as
superior law.'
Independence constitutions were like negotiated treaties. They were
often more the product of ad hoc bargaining in London than the re-
flection of popular demands and manifestations of indigenous political
culture. They were also often extraordinarily complex. 7 But by accept-
ing a constitutional document worked out in London on the eve of inde-
pendence, a regime in Africa could hasten the attainment of national
sovereignty and the entrenchment of its own power. Once independent,
the regime could change the constitution to suit local needs and, not sur-
prisingly, to tighten its own control over the political system. Most in-
dependence constitutions did not last long. They were soon formally
scrapped or amended. The details of particular histories are of course
complicated, but at the risk of overgeneralization, some trends may be
noted.'" The parliamentary system was discarded in favor of an inde-
16 For general discussion see K. ROBERTS-WRAY, COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL LAW
(1966); De Smith, Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth Today, 4 MALAYA L REV. 205
(1962).
17 On these phenomena, see, e.g., Y. BHAI AND J. MCAUSLAN, tupra note 12, at 177-219.
For the most verbose and complex of these documents, see chapter II of the Constitution of
Kenya (the bill of rights). For a good discussion of problems with "standard form" const-itu
rions of the Colonial office, see McAuslan, The Republican Constitution of Tanganjika, 13
INT'L & COMP. LQ. 502 (1964).
58The literature on political change in Africa-both country studies and gcneral-is of
course enormous. For some recent collections of overviews, see, e.g., THE MILITARY INTER-
VENES; CASE STUDIES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (H. Biennen ed. 1968) (case studies of
the military in politics); GOVERNING IN BLACK AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES ON NEW STATES (K.
Doro and M. Schultz eds. 1970); THE STATE OF THE NATIONS: CONSTRAINTS ON DEVELOP-
MENT IN ]NDEPENDENT AFRICA (Lofchie ed. 1971); BASIC ISSUES AND PROBLEMS OF
GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (I. Markovitz ed. 1970); ("readers" containing some of
the more lasting literature of the '60's); Decalo, Military Coups and Afilitary RegivreS In
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pendently elected executive and head of state with broad powers, includ-
ing emergency-type powers to control allegedly subversive political dis-
sent. Federalism and bicameralism, where established, sooner or later,
were abolished, and strong systems of central control were developed. In
most countries, opposition parties lacked a broad base, and were co-opted
or swallowed up by the group in power or otherwise rendered impotent-
sometimes by extra-legal harassment. In the past decade, virtually no
government in power has handed over power to another political faction
victorious at the polls; succession to political power has come by force.
Political development has, of course, followed different models in dif-
ferent countries. In some, presidential regimes, built around a charis-
matic leader, have held power through a one-party system (de facto or de
jure), quiescent parliaments, and co-option of the civil service. Govern-
ment usually has controlled the major media directly, either because news-
papers and broadcasting are established as state enterprises, or because
the independent media are controlled.' 9 The leadership of independent
interest groups-labor unions, capitalists, chiefs and others-has also of-
ten been co-opted. 0 Preventive detention laws are commonplace and
have been written to provide little encouragement for judicial review of
procedures followed or grounds invoked to curtail freedom.
Some presidential regimes have been deposed by military leaders. The
cause of-or pretense for-this phenomenon is said to be impatience
Africa, 11 J. MOD. AFR. STUDIES 105 (1973) (an interesting review of much of the literature
on military coups and the "political roles" of the military in Africa); Klinghoffer, Modernisation
and Political Development in Africa, 11 J. MOD. AFR. STUDIES 1 (1973) (discussing "frame-
works" for analysis); Wallenarein, Class and Class Conflict in Contemporary Africa, 7 CAN. J.
AFRICAN STUDIES 375 (1973) (use of class and class conflict in the analysis of African politi-
cal change).
19See, e.g., W. HACHTEN, MUFFLED DRUMS: THE NEWS MEDIA IN AFRICA (1971);
REPORTING AFRICA IN THE AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS (0. Stokke ed. 1971);
NIGERIAN PRESS LAW (I. Elias ed. 1969). In 1966 the Minister of Information of Kenya was
quoted as saying: "When VOK [the Voice of Kenya] was a private corporation it gave fair play
to both sides but now that it is a Government voice, naturally it will only convey the voice of
the Government." Nairobi Sunday Nation, May 29, 1966, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
IN KENYA (C. Gertzel, M. Goldschmidt and D. Rothchild eds. 1969). Cf. Y. GHAI AND
J. McAUSLAN, supra note 12, at 56. It is interesting to note that while social scientists have
suggested the enormous importance of opening up the processes of communication in develop-
ing countries, little attention is paid to the working of law relevant to the system of communi-
cating. See COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (L. Rye ed. 1963).
20 The formulation and conduct of interest group associations may be regulated in various
ways, e.g., by the requirement that associations be registered with some government ministry,
For a discussion of the use of these laws see Y. GHAI AND J. MCAUSLAN, supra note 12, at
450. Unsuccessful efforts in Zambia of the dominant party to co-opt its opposition are dis-
cussed, sympathetically, in Pettman, Zambia's Second Republic-The Establishment of a One-
Party State, 12 J. MOD. AFR. STUDIES 231 (1974). Cf. Steel v. Attorney General, 1967-78
Afr. L. Rep. S.L. 1 (1967) (Suit to prevent government from establishing a one-party state
on the ground that this would violate established guarantees of freedom of speech and associa-
tion).
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and disgust with existing political development, the desire for "disci-
plined," "honest," "stable," "efficient" government. Under this second
mode of political development, self-proclaimed revolutionary military
councils have usually suspended those parts of the constitution which are
inconsistent with their own exercise of an absolute decree power. Mili-
tary regimes abolish the pretense of electoral politics and often increase
the control of the bureaucracy. The courts are usually told to continue
to function as before, and, subject to the superior executive decree power,
the legal system is left intact-at least so long as it is not used to dispute
the legitimacy of those in power. 2
Tanzania supplies a third and interesting model of change. Public
law has been shaped by an active innovative ideology calling for devel-
opment of new political institutions in order to create a democratic, one-
party, humanitarian, socialist state.' Subject to party regulation, compe-
titive elections have been retained, and seats in Parliament have been
vigorously contested, and incumbents regularly ousted; but the role of
MP's and many of the powers of Parliament appear to have been subordi-
nated to policies prescribed by party councils supposedly responsive to
regional and local party bodies. A deliberate decision was made not to
include a bill of rights in the Tanzanian constitution, and judicial power
to review actions of government outside the realm of criminal adjudica-
tion is increasingly limited. President Nyerere has repeatedly asserted
the "rule of law" as a value to be secured,2 4 and there have been interest-
ing debates on ways to assure legality within the new kind of polity en-
visioned. An ombudsman-type institution, the Permanent Commission of
Enquiry, has been developed to secure protection against abuses of power
by government officials.2 5  A national legal corporation has been created
-2 For an illustration of the kind of law promulgated to legitimize a military coup, see, e.g.,
Proclamation for the Constitution of a National Liberation Council for the Administration
of Ghana (1966)-perhaps a "model" for this sort of legislative instrument. On the legality
of governments which take power forcibly, see the extraordinarily academic approach of the
Uganda High Court in Ex parte Matovu, 1966 E.A. 514; in this case the court entered into a
learned discussion of Kelsen's jurisprudence to determine constitutionality of the govern-
ment established by President Obote who had convened a rump of the "national assembly," and,
wi h the coercion of armed soldiers, secured approval of a new constitution-which the mem-
bers of the "'constitutional" assembly were permitted to read after voting their approval. Cf.
Crabb, Coups d'Etat and Constitutions of Black Africa in LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES (J. Hazard and W. Wagner eds.
1970). Eweluka, The Military System of Administration in Nigeria, 10 AFR. L STUDIES 67
(1974); Aguda and Aguda, supra note 13.
-9 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
ONE PARTY STATE (Tanzania 1965); The Arusha Declaration of TANU (1967); L CLIFFE
& J. SAUL, SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (1972) (Contains a
number of interesting documents and reading describing political institutioas).
24 Sce, e.g., Nyerere, Terms of Reference to Presidential One Party State, in REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 23, at paragraphs 57-59.
25 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, id. For material on the Permanent
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and the practicing profession may soon be socialized. 20 Courts are seen
as part of government, not independent of it, and the inherited colonial
legal system may soon be dismantled in other ways, e.g., by efforts to
"de-legalize" much of the business of the court,; and to "de-profession-
alize" much of the work hitherto ascribed to lawyers.27
Thus political systems in former British territories are characterized
in part by: a leader or group who claim to speak for the masses; a strong
central government; a one-party or no party system-or in any event the
lack of competitive polities; strict governmenta[ control over informa-
tion and its dissemination; mistrust of political opposition; and a wide
network of security laws and harsh penalities to control its manifesta-
tions. The civil service is not the independent, neutral body envisioned
by the independence constitutions; its upper ranks are often-in compar-
ative terms-wealthy and elitist, hierarchical and authoritarian in out-
look. It is significantly controlled by the political leadership of the "exec-
utive" branch, and the line between politician and civil servant is
blurred. Political leaders espouse a democratic, egalitarian ideology which
often seems to embody more of the spirit of Rousseau than of the cold
legalistic philosophy of earlier Anglo-American political developers. They
claim to speak and act for a general will, and profess a fervent desire
to improve conditions of life and opportunity. They demand unity and
loyalty, and emphasize a new national identity and destiny, and the value
of the new, omnipresent service state. Some may be skeptical of the sin-
cerity of such claims, but there are many who believe that the authori-
tarian, technocratic service state, which blends tradition with political
modernization, is the only appropriate model, at least for the time being.21
As Seidman notes, it is generally thought that courts have played
marginal roles in the course of this political development. There have
been relatively few constitutional cases; litigants have not attempted to
use the courts to challenge the legality of seizures or dubious exercises
Commission see, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 4. at chap. V and Annual Reports of the Per.
manent Commission for 1966/67 (1968); 1967/68 (1969); 19(8/69 (1970).
26 See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 4, at 54-81; LAW AND ITU ADMINISTRATION IN A ONII
PARTY STATE: SELECTED SPEECHES OF TELFORD GEORGES (James and Kassam eds. 1973)
(views of the Former Chief Justice of Tanzania). The Tanzania Legal Corporation was estab-
lished pursuant to the Tanzania Legal Corporation (Establishment) Order, 1970 (Govern.
menr Notice No. 32 published 19/2/71), and the Tanzania Legal Corporation (Board of Di-
rectors) Regulations 197 (Gov't Notice No. 137, 11/6/71 ). The Corporation is empowered
to provide legal services to public corporations and to parastatals and to the government as
directed by the Attorney General.
27 See James, Implementing the Arusha Declaration-The Role of the Legal System, 3 AIIR,
REV. 1970 (1973).
28 See sources in note 18, supra, for some literature on this subject. See H. BlrroN,
POWER AND POLITICS IN AFRICA (1973) and R. FIRST, POWER IN AFRICA (1970) for critical
analyses of recent trends.
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of power by governments. The bar has not organized to defend consti-
tutional rights; and few if any civil rights groups or other public inter-
est law organizations exist to provide publicity, muscle and expertise
for this kind of activity. Further, other basic legal tools for defending
human rights are lacking-from law books (to provide detailed commen-
tary on the meaning of complicated provisions commonly found in the
bills of rights in African constitutions) to local theories about their ef-
ficacy. Until recently, most African lawyers learned little about consti-
tutional law as a species of law to be made and enforced through a cre-
ative, assertive profession and judiciary.
Seidman discusses a few cases which he regards as illustrative of the
way in which constitutional issues have been commonly treated by appel-
late courts. Some additional cases are cited and discussed below.- To a
considerable extent these decisions share common characteristics.30 Of-
ten issues are certified, usually in an abstract form, to the reviewing
court for decision. Thus the courts may lack records sufficient to pro-
vide a factual context for analysis. The distinction between judging the
29 See, e.g., D.P.P. v. Obi, 1961 All N.L.R. 181 (Sedition conviction upheld against con-
stitutional objections; the test is the dangerous tendency of the words to incite disaffection
against the government, it is an "objective" test; evidence of the actual effect of the publication
is not necessary); Dahiru Cheranci v. Akali Cherand, 1960 N.N.LR. 24 (validity of statute
proscribing incitement of minors to participate in political activity); Ex parse Motovu, 1966
E.A. 514 (Uganda) (validity of detention orders issued under emergency powers regulations;
court refuses to review exercise of ministerial discretion); Ojiebe v. Ubani, 1961 N.LR. 277
(validity of law fixing Saturday as day of election, objection of religious group swept aside).
See also Adegbane v. Akintola, 1963 S.C. 614 (Privy Council decision upholding constitutional-
ity of Akinrola's removal as premier of the Western Region; dicta that the text of constitutions
must be read literally; little consideration of jurisdictional and justiciability issues); Awolowo
v. Arki, discussed in 1 NIGERIAN L.J. 104 (1964) (validity of immigration service order
excluding Awolowo's counsel, a member of the Nigerian bar but not a citizen, from enter-
ing the country); Gamioda v. Esezi I!, 1961 All N.L.R. 584 (Procedure for Referral of Con-
stitutional Issues; only the question is to be referred, not the record); Merchants Bank Ltd. v.
Federal Minister of Finance, 1961 All N.L.R. 598 (validity of order revoking Bank's license;
banking is "privilege" not a "right," therefore no deprivation of constitutional right to fair
hearing and impartial tribunal).
31 For discussion of these and related criticism, see, e.g., Aguda and Aguda, supra note 13;
Ezejiofor, supra note 13; Read, supra note 13; Williams, supra note 13; and cf. Elias, suprs
note 19. On strict interpretation of constitutions, as if they were statutes, compare F. BENNION,
supra note 13 with Gyandoh, supra note 13; see also L GOWER, INDEPENDENT AFRICA:
THE CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1967). On the binding power of prior deci-
sions, compare SAWYERS AND HILLYER, THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL (1971) with Newbody, Value of Precedent Arising from Cases Decided in East Africa
as Compared with those Decided in England, 2 E. AR. L REv. 1 (1969) (in which the Chief
Justice is critical of the U.S. Supreme Court). On the indulgence in presumptions in favor of
the legislative judgment, see, e.g., Zafer, Kachusa's Case, 1 Z.&IA31 LJ. (1969) (critical
analysis of Zambian decision upholding validity of compulsory flag salute and oath in school
exercise). See also Gyandoh, The Role of the judiciary Under the Conititufional Proposals for
Ghana, 5 U. GHANA L.J. 133 (1968). For discussion of some of the problems of developing
judicial review in Ethiopia, see 1 J. PAUL & C. CLAPHAM, supra note 13, at 401-02, and 2
J. PAUL & C. CLAPHAM at 919-25. A wide ranging review reviews in Akiwumi, Human
Rights and Africa Courts in LEGAL PROCESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supre note 9.
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validity of a law (or administrative rule) "on its face," as opposed to "as
applied" in the case at hand, seems to be ignored, even when this tech-
nique might be used to circumscribe executive power without inviting
great political controversy.
Courts have not only interpreted constitutional guarantees of individ-
ual rights narrowly, they have also assumed a heavy presumption in fa-
vor of constitutionality. They have often expressed the admonition that
judges must not read their personal values into a constitution-sometimes
naively assuming that by saying this and little more they avoid problems
of choice and value analysis in decision-making. Courts have deferred to
legislative judgments even in cases where the existence of such judgment
would appear to be more fiction than fact. The decisions often reflect
a mechanical application of the law-a reading of constitutions as if they
were contracts to be strictly construed. Problems of interpretation are
frequently treated as semantic matters (dictionary definitions may be
quoted and emphasized) rather than as issues which call for identification
and analysis of inevitably competing interests. When interests are identi-
fied, they are characterized in summary, superficial terms. The serious
implications of a particular ruling (e.g., the adoption of a "dangerous
tendency" test for seditious words) are seldom explored. The courts
have not used, or examined in any great detail, constitutional materials
from other jurisdictions. Despite the autonomy of the constitution, re-
liance is placed on English cases, and sometimes the very cases relied upon
have been both effectively criticized by persuasive commentary and quali-
fied by subsequent decisions in England.3
Thus, as Seidman asserts, African decisions usually do not measure up
to the "Grand Style"-although the "Grand Style" may be more an
American phenomenon32 than one which often characterizes judicial de-
cisions on public law questions in other parts of the common law world.
In any event, if the expectation was that courts would be vigorous in
developing a constitutional jurisprudence around bills of rights, these
expectations have not been met.
Nevertheless, the experience has not been entirely negative. It
would appear that legal scholars have attempted to measure the impact
of constitutional guarantees by looking solely at the performance of
3 1 The "bills of rights" of Anglophonic African constitutions were drawn from the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, iee, e.g., Elias, supra rote 10, of conference on The Nigeria
Constitution held in London in May and June 1957. It is somewhat surprising---as a matter
of theory-that African jurists have been unwilling to search for a more .ui generil constitu-
tional jurisprudence, and to make wider use of comparative materials.
32 The "grand style" is, in part, a product-and reflection of the American Realistic Move-
ment. It is a thesis directed at American appellate adjudication, 4/. W. TwINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 205-15 (1973).
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courts, rather than the performance of other agencies. It is possible that
constitutional guarantees have influenced government lawyers when they
counsel or draft legislation. These guarantees may have influenced parli-
amentary and cabinet debates as well as policy-making. They may even
have influenced the training of police and other officials.33
On some notable occasions judges in Africa have displayed indepen-
dence and integrity in the handling of political trials, and in a number of
cases courts have reversed criminal convictions using sharp terms for fail-
ure to recognize procedural rights of the defendant3 4 Judges in Africa
have continued to insist that they are-and that they must be-:-.indepen-
dent. Many have continued quite openly, notwithstanding the growth of
the authoritarian state, to support the ideas of constitutionalism and of
an independent judiciary armed with the power to enforce a bill of
rights. 5
Following the overthrow of Nkrumah, Ghanian lawyers took the
leadership in drafting a new constitution with an expanded bill of rights,
reinstatement and expansion of judicial review, and other new institutions
to secure observance of the constitution.30 Similarly, an Ethiopian com-
mission, appointed in the first era of the profound political change now
underway and significantly staffed by lawyers, proposed an expanded bill
of rights and power of judicial review to enforce it.37 In Nigeria, the Su-
preme Court has adopted the position that the bill of rights has not been
suspended as a result of the military coup. Rather, the court has held
that unless the military government explicitly decrees otherwise, the
bill of rights will remain in effect, and military legislation will be subject
to judicial reviewY8 Thus, despite a somewhat discouraging experience,
the belief still prevails among many lawyers in Africa that judicial review
3 3 Points stressed by L GOWER, supra note 30.
34 A good case study is set out in an unpublished monograph on the development of
criminal procedure in Uganda, NSEKERE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTe IN
UGANDA (1973).
3 5 See, e.g., Aguda and Aguda, supra note 13 and writings by other judges cited in note 10.
See ADEBIYI, THE ExEcuTIVE AND THE JUDIcIARY: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE IN LEGAL
PROCESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 9 at 159. Adebiyi is a Justice of the High Court
of Nigeria.
36 See PROPOSALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION FOR A CONSTITUTION FOR
GHANA (1968); Gyandoh, supra note 30.
37 The proposals of the Commission are set out in the Ethiopian Herald, August 10, 1974,
p. 3. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Commission which drafted the proposed con.
stitution were distinguished Ethiopian jurists. The technical staff was primarily composed by
law faculty, lawyers and law students. The bill of rights proposed is perhaps the most liberal
in Africa.
""See Lakanmi v. Attorney General of the West set out in 5 NIG. LQ. 133 (1970) dis-
cussed at length in Eweluka, supra note 22. THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION IN
NIGERIA, 10 AFR. L STUDIES 67 1974). See also Adebiyi, supra note 35.
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is an important institution to be developed within legal and political sys-
tems.
III. EXPLANATIONS
Seidman (and others3') suggest that constitutional models patterned
on the colonial office vision were doomed. Verification of this interpre-
tation is found not only in experience, but in explanations for it. And,
certainly an examination of reasons why constitutionalism and judicial
review have allegedly failed should be of great importance to political
leaders, jurists, planners and students of comparative law and govern-
ment.
The explanations range from doctrinal, legalistic reasons to discus-
sions of the social and political context; but few commentators have
attempted to deal comprehensively with the subje:t, and there is, as pre-
viously noted, a considerable hiatus between the lawyer-authored litera-
ture on legal development and social science literature explaining politi-
cal change. Evidence to support one theoretical explanation or another is
frequently lacking.
Some legal commentators have emphasized weaknesses in the form
alid content of constitutions. The bills of rights of African states are said
to be unworkable because they are too complex and cumbersome in con-
tent; they have been qualified to such a degree and in such a way that
powerful officials and lawyers of government and the courts can all too
easily rationalize evasions."'
Further, it is noted that constitutionalism was not part of the colonial
heritage; there were no established traditions and practices at the time of
independence. Until the eve of independence, most colonial govern-
ments were organized as highly efficient administrative states. The colo-
nial bureaucracy was subject neither to popular control nor to judicial
control. Indeed the "modern" sector of the "dual" legal system-the
transferred common law-was not developed to control government;
rather it was developed as an instrument of colonial policy to facilitate
growth of a "modern" social sector. The courts which administered "mod-
ern" law were an arm of the colonial government, staffed by judges
who had been recruited for colonial service, who served first in one col-
ony and then another, and whose roots were in the colonial system, not in
any territory.4 African lawyers coming from these traditions could hard-
39 See note 4, supra.
40 See, e.g., Aihe, Neo-Nigerian Rights in Zambia, 3 ZAMBIA LJ. 43 (1972).
41 See Y. G14AI AND J. McAUSLAN, jupra vote 12, at chap. IV, IX Scoton, Judihd Indo.
pendence and Pohtical Expression in East Africa-Two Colonhd Legacies, 6 E. APR. LJ. 1
(1970).
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ly be expected to move easily into the role of a John Marshall. Indeed,
by virtue of its English-oriented, professional education and accultura-
tion, the bar was not familiar with the roles which a system of judicial
review requires. Many lawyers were probably weaned on the writings
of those eminent English scholars who tell us that it is impossible to draft
meaningful bills of rights without qualifying them, and it is impossible
to qualify bills of rights without destroying them.42  These prescriptions
have sometimes been treated by African-oriented commentators as if they
were social facts, not arguments. In any event the profession, qua pro-
fession, seems to have lacked the ideology and possibly some of the tech-
nical legal skills to nourish the system. It lacked lawyers capable of play-
ing an active articulate role in mobilizing the use of the legal process to
defend human rights. The organized bar was not an active force in edu-
cating the public about constitutions and civil rights and the value of the
system.43
Further, current studies of the legal profession may tend to show that,
despite the socio-economic status of lawyers as an elite group in urban
society, the political influence of the bar, like that of the received mod-
ern legal system, has been limited. The work of the bar and the formal,
modern courts (as opposed to local and customary courts) has been re-
stricted, often to a small number of clients and primarily to private trans-
actions falling within an urbanized commercial sector of society.44 Law-
yers, the processes and language of the law, and the books and technical
learning required to understand them were alien in many ways to the or-
dinary citizen. Access to law was limited. Thus, the tenets of constitu-
tionalism figured little in the socialization and education of most citizens.
Perhaps people simply have not seen the courts as potential protectors of
4 2 See, e.g., K. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 11 (1956). Cf. MARTIN, Jupra note
4 at 38-45.
43 In East and Central Africa, an African bar is of very recent origin. In West Africa the
training of lawyers for lawyer roles in developing countries was sadly neglected until indepen-
dence. The weakness of the legal profession in providing legal services to the public is dis-
cussed in Dunning, Legal Systems and Legal Services in Africa in LEGAL AID AND WORLD
POVERTY: A SURVEY OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA (1974). A good discussion of
the state of the profession and professional training and acculturation is to be found in Y.
GHAI, LEGAL EDUCATION IN ANGLOPHONIc APRICA (1972) (Paper prepared for the In-
ternational Legal Center Committee on Legal Education in Developing Countries). See also W.
HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA, chap. IV (1966); Twining, Legal Education
Within East Africa in EAST AFRICAN LAW TODAY (1966).
44 Useful material on the legal profession in Africa is sparse. But ef. Y. GHAI AND J.
McAuSLAN, supra note 12, at 386-96. The International Legal Center is sponsoring sodo-
legal research on the profession in Kenya and Ghana which seems to support the hypotheses
suggested above. These studies were discussed at a Workshop on Social Science Research Meth-
odology and Perspectives on Legal Research held in Nairobi in June 1974. For an indictment
of the Ghana legal profession's failure during the Nkrumah period, see 1. OMARI, KWAE
NKRumAH: THE ANATOMY OF AN AFRICAN DICTATORSHIP (1970).
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their rights. Nor have they seen the bar and the judiciary as selfless, in-
dependent custodians of an autonomous constitution to be preserved for
ages to come. Rather, the modern law and legal system may appear as
arms of government and as agencies for enforcing government policy."
Arguably, there have been other conditions which have hindered the
development of constitutionalism and undermined the role envisioned for
courts. The "dualism" of African societies has often been noted; the
term is used to emphasize the dichotomies between people who live
in a "modern setting" and those who live "traditional" lives. We are
told that colonial policy, i.e. the political arrangements of "indirect rule"
and the economic activities and infrastructures encouraged by colonial
government, accentuated this dualism and have thus segmented African
societies. A small modern sector of the population has emerged as a
well-educated, multi-lingual, Western-oriented, elite, urban, white-collar
group. The traditional sector, the great mass of people, has remained
largely illiterate, rural, non-English speaking and poor, living essentially
at subsistence levels. Of course, generalizations are difficult, but in many
regions, it is argued, traditional people have continued to follow clan
and tribal customs and have been barely touched, if touched at all, by
culture transferred by the colonial power. Traditional people have been
politically inactive and passive toward the central government. Their
primary concerns are provincial and parochial. 0
Until recently, the modern sector has been dominated in many ways
by civil servants. Government employment, including employment in
burgeoning, parastatal enterprises, has been a growth industry,4 and it
has been the primary goal of most secondary school and college leavers.
Government employment is relatively secure, carries a promise of promo-
tion, and provides an income which exceeds that of the average citizen.18
Educational systems have oriented the educated young elite toward civil
service careers. In various ways the importance of the managerial civil
servant and the power and beneficence of the executive service state are
4 5 ee Dunning, supra note 43. President Kavnada noted:
Zambia today labours under many legacies of the colonial era. One is a very unfor-
tunate attitude of many people towards the police and the courts and, indeed, the
law itself... [which) came to be regarded as enemies of the people. This is very
sad, and particularly so because the attitudes of this kind take a long time to eradicate.
quoted in Thomas, Legal Education in Africa, 22 N. IRELAND LQ. 3, 23 (1971 see Barnes,
The Politics of Law in MAN IN AFRIcA 1 (Douglas & Kanberry eds. 1969).
46 See Harvey, Democratic Values, Social Change and Legal Institutions in The Develop.
,aent Process in NATIONS BY DESIGN (A. Rivkin ed. 1968).
4 7 See Jolly, Employment, Wage Levels and Incentives in MANPOWER ASPECTS OF EDU.
CAT7ONAL PLANNING; PROBLEMS FOR THE FUTURE (1968); J. NYERERE, EDUCATION FOR
SELF-RELIANCE (1967); Ghai, Society, Education and Development, 9 E. APR. L.J. 16 (1972),
48 See Kirk-Green, The New African Administrator, 10 J. MOD. APR. STUDIES 92 (1972),
[Vol. 35
JUDICIAL REVIEW
subtly celebrated. Thus the position of government and parastatal activ-
ity in the modern sector has tended to build up statist attitudes towards
political life. Many in the private part of the modern sector--business.
men and private professionals-have become affluent, but the private
sector has been less influential in developing powerful centers of inde-
pendent activity and countervailing attitudes towards the administrative
state. Rather, the private sector is supportive of political stability and the
status quo. All of these factors may affect the outlook of lawyers and
judges.
Again the propositions set forth above are oversimplified and, at best,
illustrative hypotheses to explain the alleged failure of constitutionalism
within African political systems. They are not necessarily supported by
persuasive evidence, and more important, they may be grounded upon
social conditions which are rapidly changing.
Indeed, it may well be that the dualism discussed above-and so of-
ten stressed in the literature-no longer exists, or at least is disappearing
in many regions, as schools, roads, literacy, mass media, cooperatives and
commercial agriculture penetrate the countryside. Further, in some coun-
tries, there are growing numbers of urban wage earners whose economic
opportunities may be increasingly threatened by rampant inflation, grow-
ing unemployment and an increasing difference between wages paid for
labor and the salaries automatically paid pursuant to fixed scales to more
educated white-collar civil servants. Lower income urban groups may
turn increasingly to trade unionism and other forms of interest articula-
tion to assert new demands upon the political system. Students and un-
employed school leavers too, may now also be a more vocal dissenting
group in some countries.49 These changes may significantly affect the
context of the political system, the demand for new kinds of laws to pro-
tect the new interests and new kinds of access to the legal system.
IV. THE FUTrURE
I turn now to a discussion of the future of constitutionalism and the
desirability of judicial review in African political development.6
The view among many academic lawyers is negative. Thus, judicial
review is characterized as both cumbersome and alien to Africa's political
and legal cultures, exalting the powers of judges unwisely. Citing the
well-known English strictures, some lawyers argue that means for protec-
49 See Gutkind, The Unemployed and Poor in Urban Africa in TH D WORLD EMPLOY-
MENT (1973).
50 See Harvey, rupra note 46. See notes 4, 10 and 13 supra. The various viewpoints
in this section were developed and discussed at the Nairobi Workshop (tee note 44) by law
teachers and lawyers from central and eastern Africa.
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tion of human rights must be found in other democratic processes, e.g., in
a vital parliamentary institution and a properly trained civil service sensi-
tive to "natural justice" and the protection of the public.
Others see the demise of constitutionalism as part of the general de-
dine of law and the legal system as an independent force in society.
The all-powerful service state is assumed to be a continuing, central,
political fact of life, and can best function through the work of well-
trained technicians. More and more, law will be made through execu-
tive and administrative action and enforced through administrative tri-
bunals. Thus, special tribunals might be established to carry out changes
in land tenure, and to regulate employment relationships and other aspects
of the economy. These tribunals may also settle disputes arising with
public corporations and other government enterprises and, perhaps, en-
force government security laws. The judicial power to review acts of these
tribunals will gradually decrease, and there will be fewer opportunities for
citizens to challenge government actions in those courts which remain
outside the governmental system. The role of lawyers in legal develop-
ment and as guardians of legal values will slowly but surely diminish!t
This picture of the future is sometimes cast in more emphatic ideologi-
cal perspectives. Thus, some take a highly critical view of African de-
velopment over the last decade. The economic profile of societies is
said to show increasing maldistribution of the berefits of economic growth,
increasing disparities in income and the emergence of new centers of eco-
nomic power. A political profile may show that the effective authority of
the state is concentrated in an alliance of groups, e.g., the upper strata in
the civil service, military and private sectors. Corruption is said to be
widespread, and Gunnar Myrdal's characterization of the massive "soft"
state is cited to depict the situation. And the power of the law, it may
be asserted, is on the side of the stateY2
Tanzania is sometimes contrasted with the model projected above.
The Tanzanian model calls for a classless society, personal sacrifice, in-
dividual renunciation of economic gain, and collectivization of resources.
The national party is to be a broad-based organ for governance and a
primary vehicle for formulating policy to advance goals of equality, better
standards of living and understanding and enforcement of one's social ob-
ligations: Although official Tanzanian ideology has stressed the "rule of
law," this increasingly means a form of socialist legality which cannot
51 The importance of growth of administrative and special tribunals outside the legal sys.
tern in Kenya is traced in Y. GHAI AND McAUSLAN, supra note 12, at 299-309. Presumably
the trends described there may apply elsewhere.
52 See Myrdal, The Soft State in Underdeveloped Coutntriet, 15 U.C.L.A. L. RIMV, 1118
(1968).
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be secured either by courts, or by formal legal processes of litigation.
Rather, the appropriate organs to achieve this socialist legality are party
councils, the ombudsman institution, and enforcement (through various
agencies) of proscriptions against individual aggregation of wealth, at-
tempts to abuse, or efforts to assume special status in society.
Of course, the Tanzanian model is not the only one. Some who ap-
plaud Nyerere's extraordinary leadership may, however, detect growing
trends towards coerced collectivization and a stifling of individual inde-
pendence and pluralism in society. The lack of legal guarantees and the
absence of a commitment to law as an independent social force may, in
the view of some, having troubling long-range implications. 3 In any
event, other models for future political development-which make more
use of law-may be advanced.
Perhaps the development of a powerful centralized state has been a
necessary first step in nation-building: it was necessary to establish gov-
ernments which could govern. But now, confronted with growing politi-
cal oligarchies, authoritarian governments, powerful bureaucracies, abuse
of power and maldistribution of public investment and the fruits of de-
velopment, some have argued that what African polities need are leaders
who will reverse the process of the previous decade and bring about a
deconcentration of political power-and new institutions which will en-
able decentralization of government. Certainly it has now become fash-
ionable to call for new institutions and processes to secure more popular
participation in the political system and greater electoral control over re-
gional and local units of government which should enjoy more control
over taxation, expenditure, development planning and other functions of
government." Similarly, it may be argued that urban wage earners need
to be given a greater share in the management of private and state enter-
prises. In essence, the service state has neither sufficient wisdom nor suf-
ficient capacity to do by itself the things which must be done to satisfy
emerging human wants. Further, development depends, far more than
has been perceived, on enhancement of a citizen's sense of identity with,
and stake and participation in, the civic and economic community. This
approach may lead to new arguments that pluralism has undiscovered
values, and efforts to stifle it by coerced efforts at unity and central control
over local affairs may be counterproductive in the long run and incon-
53 Cf. James, supra note 27.
54See Address by Robert S. McNamara to the Board of Governors of the World Bank
(1973) for an eloquent exposition of this view In effect McNamara argues-but without
exploring the legal iamkfications-for new rights for the rural poor, new rights to secure land
reform, access to water resources and credit and technical services and schools, health, market
and other fadlities as well as new rights of access to institutions exercising political power.
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sistent with fundamental goals of development. Thus, there may be new
calls for an enlargement of the sphere of legally protected civil rights and
a greater recognition of their importance.
These contrasting views raise fascinating issues, and perhaps demon-
strate some aspects of the neglected importance of legal development as
a component of political development. It may be that the ideal of rule of
law faces severe challenges in much of the developing world. Perhaps,
out of disagreements about the value of this ideal and its future may come
some new synthesis. Perhaps, if formal law is to prove useful in the lives
of most Africans, its benefits will have to become more visible and avail-
able than they have been heretofore. And the system whereby individ-
uals can assert their claims must be made more accessible.
To increase access to the legal system and thereby reinforce the rule
of law, one necessary step may be to broaden availability of professional
legal services. This may be difficult in poor countries where the educa-
tion of professionals is expensive, legal services are costly, and many in
the private profession prefer the social status quo. Reforms here may
require changes in the processes of acculturation and professional train-
ing of lawyers; these have heretofore placed too little emphasis on prob-
lems of social justice. In any event, the delivery of professional legal
services may be only one aspect of a broad array of problems. Measures
may be needed to strengthen access to and confidence in law by changing
the language for its administration-by providing more education about
law in society through schools, the media and other groups. Measures
may be needed to open up access to basic level courts by reducing pro-
cedural formality and enhancing opportunities for popular participation.
Alternative means for dispute settlement, such as arbitration and media-
tion, may need study and development. Policies towards customary
law and its relation to modern law may need new examination. Another
step, in some settings, might entail rehabilitation (through training and
regulation) of the roles of traditional, non-professional legal function-
aries-such as "bush lawyers," lay pleaders, scribes and other kinds of
agents who have provided services to the poor and ignorant in some Afri-
can communities.
Efforts to open access to the legal system may need to be coupled with
efforts to reformulate the content of guaranteed legal rights in society.
The range of rights including equality of opportunity, freedom from op-
pression or overreaching in economic relations, freedom to form associa-
tions and secure access to the media, and freedom from abuses of admin-
istrative power may need re-examination and creative redefinition. Much
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innovative, "normative" legal thinking may be needed to make civil rights
law more relevant to popular needs.
Socio-egal thinking" and research are also surely needed. The lines
of reform sketched above are only suggestive. They may depend on
hypotheses yet to be formulated which will need empirical investigation.
What should be done is obviously a subject for debate in other quarters.
But perhaps fruitful discussion of the future of constitutionalism and
judicial review in Africa (and perhaps throughout the world) may de-
pend in part on the ability of political leaders, lawyers, legal educators
and researchers-and those who goad them into action-to see the prob-
lems in new contexts.
55 See Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 125 (1973).
